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A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test
When the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States1 in
1967, some commentators viewed the case as paving the way for
possible expansion of fourth amendment2 protection3 against unreasonable search and seizure. 4 Subsequent developments in general fourth amendment jurisprudence, however, suggest that this
hope has not been realized. Indeed, several recent cases have actually narrowed the scope of fourth amendment protection. 5 Given
these developments, it is once again 6 appropriate to analyze the
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
3. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 190 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Supreme Court].
4. The "unreasonableness clause" of the fourth amendment-which states that
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated"-could have originally been interpreted as having meaning independent of the warrant clause. See N.
LASSON, ToE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTII AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 103 (1937). By the time Katz was decided, however,
the Court considered the question of the umeasonableness of a search or seizure
merely in terms of whether the police had met the warrant requirement of the amendment. See generally Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected
Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1977);
Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-1976), 16 MICH. L. REV.
184, 201-03 (1977). This Note is limited to a consideration of whether the right to
have expectations of privacy should prevent governmental searches in the absence of
a warrant.
5. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976), that decision was the ninth that Term
"marking the continuing evisceration of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures." The other eight decisions cited by Justice Brennan
were Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Andresen v. Macyland,
427 U.S. 463 (1976); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); United States
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); and
Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1976).
For a general discussion of recent federal court decisions that arguably narrow
the scope of several constitutional rights, see Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). But cf. Israel, Criminal
Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 15 MICH. L. REV.
1319 (1977) (suggesting that the Burger Court decisions involving criminal procedure have not eviscerated any fundamental rights of the defendant).
6. For other analyses, see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974); Dutile, Some Observations on the Supreme
Court's Use of Property Concepts i11 Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, Zl
CAm. U.L. REV. 1 (1971); Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable
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"reasonable expectation of privacy" 7 standard enunciated in Katz.
In holding that the fourth amendment "protects people, not
places," 8 the court in Katz indicated that the "constitutionally protected areas" or "trespass" standard applied in prior cases9 would
no longer be controlling. 10 Yet, if the sanctity of the home, which
is the paradigm constitutionally protected area, is to continue to be
recognized as a core value11 of the fourth amendment, then the
formulation and application of the reasonable expectation of privacy
test should be modified in certain respects. To ensure that the
fourth amendment has some minimum content that cannot be defined away by either the goveqiment or the courts, these modifications should give paramount importance to the value of living one's
daily life, particularly in one's own home, free from arbitrary and
excessive governmental intrusion. 12 Preserving this value entails
recognizing that the fourth amendment does not simply protect exExpectation of Privacy or, A Man's Home Is His Fort, 23 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 63
(1974); Note, The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy-Katz v. United States, a
Postscriptum, 9 IND. L. REV. 468 (1976); Note, From Private Places to Persona~
Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protections, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV.
968 (1968).
7. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
8. 389 U.S. at 351.
9. Under this standard, governmental intrusion did not constitute a search under
the fourth amendment unless it involved invasion of a protected area. See, e.g., On
Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129
(1942).
10. 389 U.S. at 353.
11. This value, as well as others, was articulated in the early landmark case of
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), discussed in Note, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 184, supra note 4. The Supreme Court has continued to articulate this value.
See text at notes 100-13 infra.
Courts have compared other areas to the home in order to determine whether
they should be constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (automobiles); Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir.
1969) (motel rooms).
12. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), decided a few months
prior to Katz, the Court said:
The basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless
decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. The Fourth Amendment
thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people which "is basic to a free
society."
387 U.S. at 528 (citation omitted).
Courts have also interpreted the fourth amendment as protecting other values,
such as the right to be let alone (United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 870 (5th
Cir. 1975), affd. in part and revd. in part per curiam on rehearing, 537 F.2d 227
(5th Cir. 1976) ), the right of individuality (Fix.el v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 483
(5th Cir. 1974)), the security of persons and property (Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969)), the right of personal liberty (Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427, 455 ( 1963) ( dissenting opinion)), and the right of personal dignity
(Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968)). Common to all these characterizations is
the premise that a person's daily activities are not subject to constant or arbitrary
govemmental scrutiny.
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pectations of privacy; rather, it protects the right to have certain
· expectations of privacy. In short, the minimum content of the fourth
amendment is the minimum set of expectations of privacy to which
people are entitled.
This Note, by modifying certain aspects of the reasonable
expectation of privacy test, offers a theory that attempts to identify
the minimum content of the fourth amendment. In the first section,
the Note examines the reasonable expectation of privacy test and
considers whether it has been or can be applied in a manner that
fails to protect the right to have certain minimum expectations of
privacy. It analyzes both the "actual" and the "reasonable" expectation requirements, identifies weaknesses inherent in the current
application of these requirements, and suggests certain ways in which
they might be refined. In the second section, the Note looks beyond
the literal requirements of the refined reasonable expectation of
privacy test to consider whether even after modification the test adequately protects the values implicit in the fourth amendment. First
observing that the Court has continued to identify the sanctity of the
home as being at the core of the amendment and then observing
that the pre-Katz open field-curtilage distinction continues to play
a significant role in the resolution of fourth amendment cases, it
demonstrates that the "constitutionally protected areas" test is not
inconsistent with Katz. In the final section, the Note concludes that,
rather than being viewed as retaining significance independent of the
expectations test, the protected areas test should instead be viewed
as defining a set of expectations that are safe from governmental
encroachment because they are reasonable as a matter of law.
·

I.

THE NATURE OF THE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY TEST

In Katz v. United States, the petitioner appealed his conviction for
transmitting wagering information over the telephone in violation of
a federal antigambling statute. 13 FBI agents, proceeding without a
search warrant, listened to Katz's end of the conversations by attaching an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of a
public telephone booth from which Katz had placed his calls. This
·evidence was admitted at trial over petitioner's objection. The government argued that because the agents had not physically intruded
into the telephone booth, the FBI's activity did not constitute a
search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. It
also contended that a public telephone booth was not a "constitutionally protected area," the traditional formulation used to describe
those areas protected by the amendment. The Supreme Court re13. The current statute is 18 U.S.C.

§

1084 (Supp. V 1975).
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versed Katz's conviction, holding that the fourth amendment "protects people, not places."14 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Harlan interpreted this holding to mean that a defendant will receive
fourth amendment protection only if he has a ·"reasonable expectation of privacy."15 He explained the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test as follows: "[T]here is a two-fold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy, and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " 16
As this section of the Note indicates, each element of Justice
Harlan's test, if taken to its logical extreme, might eliminate the right
to have expectations of freedom from governmental intrusion,
thereby nullifying the safeguards of the fourth amendment. Although presumably courts would never consciously manipulate the
expectations test to reach such a restrictive result, they might inadvertently come to conclusions at odds with the basic purposes of the
fourth amendment if the elements of the expectations test are unrefined or imprecise. This section of the Note, therefore, scrutinizes
on several levels the precision of the expectation of privacy standard.
A.

1.

The Actual Expectation Requirement

The Right To Have Expectations: Governmental
Manipulation of Expectations

A major difficulty with the threshold requirement that a defendant have an actual expectation of privacy stems from the possibility
that the government might. reduce--or even make it impossible to
have-such expectations simply by announcing prior to initiating any
investigation that it intends to conduct searches. If the right of
privacy is only as great as the expectation of privacy, then the government can vitiate the right simply by taking away all such expectations.
It appears that the Court in Katz began to recognize this difficulty, for it stated that people are entitled to know that they are
protected from unreasonal;,le searches and seizures. 17 Yet, by
defining "unreasonableness" in terms of what a person knows-since
expectations are based on knowledge or belief-the Court ultimately
failed to recognize any such entitlement. If the government can
condition citizens to expect that certain intrusive searches and
seizures will occur, then those searches and seizures, by definition,
14. 389 U.S. at 351.
15. 389 U.S. at 360.

16. 389 U.S. at 361 (emphasis added).
17. "Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free
from unreasonable searches and seizures." 389 U.S. at 359.
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would not be unreasonable. This analysis suggests that, by manipulating actual, subjective expectations of privacy, the government could
determine whether a particular search and seizure is unreasonable.
Professor Amsterdam emphasizes this criticism of Katz by posing an
Orwellian hypothetical in which the government flashes messages on
television informing its citizens that they are subject to constant surveillance-in such a situation, no one can be said to possess an actual
expectation of privacy. 18 Placing this amount of power in the hands
of the government is clearly inconsistent with the fourth amendment's purpose of circumscribing the ability of the government to
intrude into people's lives.
A test based on actual expectations not only allows the government to determine the reasonableness of its own agents' searches and
seizures but also makes it impossible to evaluate the constitutionality
of laws that authorize such conduct. Suppose, for example, that a
statute were enacted requiring occupants of automobiles on toll highways to submit to extensive searches of the vehicles, their persons,
and their luggage at selected toll booths. The statute is so well publicized that no one can actually expect to travel on a toll road without being thoroughly searched. If the "unreasonableness" of a
search is defihed in terms of actual expectations, then the searches
allowed by the statute cannot be said to be unreasonable. Therefore,
the statute itself, let alone -particular searches conducted pursuant to
it, cannot be held invalid on fourth amendment grounds.
Although no case has yet involved a breach of fourth amendment rights as blatant as that in either the Amsterdam or the toll road
hypothetical, in some cases it has been argued, occasionally successfully, that the fourth amendment does not protect a citizen when the
government has given advance notice of the investigative activity.
One category of advance-notice cases presents the issue of whether
ithe existence of prior frequent searches vitiates expectations of privacy with respect to later, similar searches. In People v. Superior
Court19 (hereinafter cited as Stroud, the name of the real party in
interest), police officers discovered stolen automobile parts in the
backyard of the defendant's home while circling over the area in
a helicopter. In rejecting the defendant's contention that he had
been subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure, the court
noted that police helicopters had routinely patrolled the area "for
18. Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 384. The outcome of the application of the
actual expectation criterion to this extreme situation leads to the conclusion that the
phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" makes sense only if it is a label for a result rather than a test by which a result is reached. Thus, Professor Amsterdam suggests that Katz and the fourth amendment be analyzed in terms of what citizens
should demand from their government, rather than in terms of what they actually
expect. Id. at 385.
19. 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974).
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some time." 20 Accordingly, it ostensibly concluded that the defendant must have been cognizant of the patrols and therefore _could not
have had an expectation of privacy. 21 This analysis, of course,
would support results in the Amsterdam and toll road hypotheticals
that would seriously erode fourth amendment protection. A better
approach is found in United States v. Davis, 22 where an airport search
of the defendant's carry-on briefcase revealed a concealed gun. The
court rejected the government's argument that the defendant could
not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy. In adding that the·
government could not, for example, avoid the restrictions of the. fourth
amendment simply by notifying the public that all telephone lines
would be tapped or that all homes would be searched, 23 the Davis
court apparently recognized, as the Stroud court did not, that the
amendment protects the right to have expectations of privacy.
A second category of advance-notice cases involves situations in
which the search in question was conducted pursuant to a regulation,
a contractual provision, or a posted notice specifically brought to the
attention of the defendant. In Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 24 law
enforcement officers, a~companied by university officials, searched
a student's dormitory room and discovered marijuana. The university dormitory contract, which the defendant had signed, provided
that the university reserved the right to inspect the room "under the
regular procedures of the University" and that the defendant granted
permission for such inspections. 25 The court rejected the government's contention that under these circumstances the defendant
could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding his
room. Analogizing a dormitory room to an apartment or hotel room,
the court concluded that, even though -the university had a right to
check the room for damages and for violation of safety regulations,
the defendant was still entitled to have a reasonable expectation of
privacy regarding the room. 26 Furthermore, the court held that the
defendant's contractual undertaking did not evidence his consent to
20. 37 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
21. 37 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 765. Without questioning the defendant's assertion that he had an actual expectation of privacy, the court said that
he could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy. That is, even if the frequent aerial observations had not succeeded in altering the defendant's actual expectation, they had altered the reasonableness of his expectation.
22. 482 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1973).
23. 482 F.2d at 905.
24. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970).
25. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. at 438, 272 A.2d at 274-75 (Wright, P.J., dissenting).
26. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. at 436, 272 A.2d at 273. The court's statement here is
significant in light of this Note's, position that an expectations analysis of the fourth
amendment is on the right track only if courts recognize the distinction between having an expectation and having the right to have an expectation. Accord, Piazzola
v. Watkins, 442 F:2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971). See text at notes 53-55 infra.
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the police search or his authorization of the university to consent to
such searches on his behalf. 27
In other contexts, however, courts have accepted the argument
that fourth amendment protection may be defeated by explicit reservation of the right to search. Wilson v. Commonwealth 28 upheld
the validity of a police department's search of the locker of a former
member of the department. The defendant knew that the department kept keys to all lockers and asserted the right to search them
at any time. In State v. Bryant, 29 a department store employee and
a police officer observed homosexual activities by positioning themselves over a ventilator in the ceiling above a department store restroom. Although the court held that this search was invalid under
Katz, it indicated that the store could have prevented an expectation
of privacy, and thus could have validly undertaken the search, if signs
had been posted warning anyone using the facilities that he was apt
to be under surveillance. so
The approach used in Wilson and Bryant, like that used in
Stroud, is troublesome. By simply concluding that advance notice
can vitiate expectations of privacy, these courts provide no principled
method for distinguishing the Amsterdam and toll road hypotheticals.
Although there may be ways to distinguish the factual settings in Wilson and Bryant from the facts of each of these hypotheticals, 81 such
efforts fail to come to grips with the basic weakness of an actual expectations standard: the inability of the test to distinguish situations
in which a reduction in actual expectations of privacy is justified from
those situations in which it is not.
A third category of advance-notice cases involves situations in
which the defendant has a special status that in effect gives him
27. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. at 436,272 A.2d at 273.
The law enforcement officers in McCloskey, unlike those in Katz, had a search
warrant. The fourth amendment problem arose because they entered defendant's
room without announcing their identity and purpose. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. at 434, 272
A.2d at 272. Holding that the amendment's prohibition against entering private
premises without such notice, in the absence of exigent circumstances, applied to dormitory rooms, the court found it unnecessary to determine whether the warrant was
valid. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. at 437, 272 A.2d at 274.
28. 475 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1971).
29. 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800 (1970).
30. 287 Minn. at 211, 177 N.W.2d at 804. For a discussion of this case and
other related cases, see 55 MINN. L. RBv. 1255 (1971 ).
31. This Note argues that property interests should constitute the basis for a minimum content of fourth amendment protection. See text at notes 126-33 infra, However, the argument that Bryant and Wilson can be justified on the basis of the absence of property interests-that the defendants were not protect~d because they did
not have property interests in the areas searched-suggests that such interests would
constitute a maximum content for fourth amendment protection, This test would
severely limit the scope of fourth amendment protection and, in addition, would be
extremely difficult to apply in cases in which there are divided property interests.
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prior notice that he is subject to warrantless searches, thereby reducing his expectation of privacy. This notion of special status has
appeared in cases involving probationers and parolees, where courts
have viewed the peculiar status of the defendant as giving the government an extraordinary interest in supervising his · activities.
Courts have held that this interest can justify warrantless searches
that would not have been allowed in the absence· of the individual's
special status. For example, in People v. Mason 32 the Supreme
Court of California upheld the constitutionality of the terms of the
defendant's probation, which required him to submit to a warrantless
search by the police at any time and place. The court indicated that
the defendant's special status entitled him to only a "reduced expectation of privacy." 33
Although the rationale underlying Mason is not easily discerned,
the court might have viewed probation as a privilege that must be
accepted on whatever terms it is offered. The court ·did speak in
terms of consent,34 which suggests that it might have thought that
the defendant was not entitled to expect privacy because he had
acquiesced in the terms of his probation. If Mason is based upon
the distinction between a privilege and a right, the correctness of
the result could be challenged. The right-privilege distinction has
been significantly eroded in other areas of constitutional law,35 and
it is questionable whether this is a tenable basis for determining·
whether one is entitled to expect privacy.
Instead of justifying the results in this category of cases on the
notion that probation is a privilege for which the right to expect privacy must be traded, it is better to explain them on the ground· that
the right to expect privacy must be given less weight when the particular defendant can be identified as being peculiarly dangerous to
society. When such an individual was convicted and sentenced to
serve time in prison, the judicial process determined -that the defendant's activity so threatened society that he had forfeited his liberty.
Presumably society can justify releasing a dangerous prisoner on probation only if it has the right to supervise him without obtaining a
warrant. Thus, the rationale underlying cases such as Mason appears to embody a balancing process: the interest in protecting
32. 5 Cal. 3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1016 (1972).
33. 5 Cal. 3d at 764, 488 P.2d at 633, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
34. For a more detailed discussion of the role of consent in advance-notice cases,
see text at notes 46-63 infra.
35. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare); Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (public employment). See generally Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
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society from the defendant is weighed against the interest of the defendant in his own privacy. Greater weight attaches to the former
interest if there is a particular reason to suppose that the defendant
may be dangerous to society. In Mason and similar cases, this particular reason is found in the defendant's special status as one who
has been convicted of a crime.
An example of the balancing approach is found in Latta v. Fitzharris, 36 which upheld a warrantless search of a parolee's house by
parole officers. In that case, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that, since a
parolee is subject to restrictions not applicable to the population as
a whole, his right to an expectation of privacy is reduced. 37 To explain why this reduction in expectations is justified, the court analogized the search of a parolee to an administrative search. It cited
United States v. Biswe/l, 38 where the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of a pawnshop operator's locked gun storeroom pursuant to
the Gun Control Act of 1968. 39 In Biswell, the Court stated that
inspections to check compliance with the Gun Control Act did not
infringe the gun dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy. According to the Court in Biswell, when a dealer chooses to engage in a
pervasively regulated business and accepts a federal license, he does
so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to inspection. 40 The Ninth Circuit in Latta,
after analogizing Biswell's status as a licensee of a regulated business
to Latta's status as a parolee, found that in both situations the individual's expectation of privacy is justifiably reduced.4 1
Thus, it appears that the special-status cases ultimately rely
upon the "balancing" approach typically used in the administrative
search cases: 42 the defendant's interest in freedom from governmental intrusion is balanced against the interest of society in conducting searches for the public health, safety, and welfare. Of
course, searches of probationers and parolees, like administrative
searches, involve an invasion of privacy. 43 The warrant requirement
36. S21 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (197S), discussed in 60 MINN, L. REv. 805 (1976).
37. 521 F.2d at 250. However, in United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.
2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane), which was decided on the same day as Latta,
the same court invalidated a warrantless search of a parolee's house conducted by
law enforcement officers rather than by parole officers.
38. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
39. 18 u.s.c. § 923(g) (1970).
40. 406 U.S. at 316.
41. 521 F.2d at 251.
42. See note 43 infra.
43. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the Court held that regulatory inspections for compliance with municipal codes are "searches" within the meaning of the fourth amendment and thus are subject to its warrant requirement. In order to obtain a warrant,
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of the fourth amendment was designed to ensure that such searches
do not occur without probable cause. In administrative search cases
like Biswell, courts have concluded, after balancing the relevant
interests, that warrantless administrative searches for limited purposes
do not constitute invasions of privacy that the fourth amendment
was designed to prevent. Hence, in these cases the government
can legitimately reduce the actual expectations of privacy.
The balancing approach appears to be operative in the specialstatus cases as well. The search of a probationer or parolee is less
arbitrary than the search of a criminal suspect because the special
status of the probationer or parolee identifies him as someone in
whom the government has a particularized interest that is stronger
than the general state interest in preventing crime. After balancing
this particularized interest against the individual's privacy interest,
courts have determined that warrantless searches of these special
classes of individuals do not constitute invasions prohibited by the
fourth amendment, and thus the government may properly reduce the
actual privacy expectations held by such persons.
Although the courts have devised an appropriate rationale to
support the reduction in expectations of privacy found in the specialstatus cases, they have not developed adequate theories to justify reducing these expectations in two other types of advance-notice cases
-those involving frequent uses of an investigative technique and
however, the police need not demonstrate the existence of probable cause to believe
that the conditions of a particular building violate the code; rather, they need show
only probable cause to believe that a code violation exists somewhere within the area
in which that building is located. In such cases the determination that probable
cause exists is made by balancing the government's need to inspect with the invasion
of the individual's privacy. Thus, although the probable cause requirement for obtaining a warrant for an administrative search is less particularized than that for obtaining a warrant for a search for evidence of a crime, the Court was still guarding
against arbitrary invasions of privacy by requiring that a warrant be obtained. , For
a discussion of the balancing approach employed in these cases, see United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745,782 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In See the Court cautioned- that it did not question commonly accepted regulatory techniques such as licensing programs. that require inspections prior to operating
a business or marketing a product, and it stated that any constitutional challenge to
such programs could be resolved only on a case-by-case basis. 387 U.S. at 546.
Thus, the Court left itself the option of limiting the Camara-See warrant requirement in the future. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72
(1970), and United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), the Court exercised this
option and provided lower courts with a vehicle for further limiting the requirement.
In Colonnade, the Court granted a motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search of the locked storeroom of a licensed liquor dealer on the ground that
the imposition of a fine was the exclusive sanction under the statute authorizing inspection. But the Court implied that Congress could have passed a valid statute authorizing warrantless searches of licensed liquor establishments. See 397 U.S. at 7677.
In Biswell, the Court distinguished See, stating that periodic inspection sufficed
in that case, and thus requiring a warrant would involve little threat to the effectiveness of the inspection system. In Biswell, however, unannounced and perhaps fre-
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those involving a regulation or posted notice. 44 Upholding warrantless searches in these cases without justifying the concomitant reduction in expectations of privacy appears to weaken the content of the
fourth amendment. If expectations can be eliminated simply
through advance notice of the search, then the searches in the
Amsterdam and toll road hypotheticals could be deemed consistent
with the fourth amendment. So long as any person may be deprived
of his actual expectations of privacy, there is no warrantless governmental search that falls within the category of "unreasonable"
searches prohibited by the fourth amendment.
The above analysis suggests that some situations deserve fourth
amendment protection notwithstanding the absence of an actual expectation of privacy. 45 As a matter of logic as well as policy, any
test of what constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure must go
further than merely recognizing the· rights of individuals only when
they possess actual expectations of privacy. Such a test must recognize the more basic right to have expectations of privacy. The test
must recognize that the advance notice that certain searches will be
conducted is an intrusion in itself. Even though such an announcement may reduce actual expectations, it will not validate the search,
since the notice itself violates the individual's right to have expectations of privacy.
2.

Actual Expectations and Consent

Several courts have decided advance-notice cases on the theory
quent inspections were essential to detect and to deter violations of the Gun Control
Act. After balancing the relevant interests, the Court determined that regulatory
inspections that further urgent federal interests and do not seriously threaten privacy
may proceed without a warrant where specifically authorized by statute. 406 U.S.
at 317.
This Term the Supreme Court will reconsider the question of the constitutionality
of warrantless administrative searches in Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437
(D. Idaho 1976), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 430 U.S.
964 ('1977).
44. An acute example of the failure to provide a justification for reducing actual
expectations is United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 903 (1974), prior judgment reinstated, 513 F.2d 533, cert. denied,
423 U.S. 952 (1975). In that case, the defendant was aware, through a "contact"
in the telephone company, that his telephone was being tapped. Given his awareness,
the court found it inconsistent for him to advert to an expectation of privacy. But
since no justification was offered for tapping his phone, no justification was offered
for the reduction in expectation of privacy.
45. It might be argued that one who has no actual expectation of privacy regarding a certain place can take precautions to ensure that he will not be observed conducting an illegal activity there: even though he cannot prevent the manipulation
of his expectations, he can prevent the observation of incriminating activity. The
response to this argument is that it is itself an intrusion for the government to create
the necessity of taking such precautions. For further discussion of precautions, see
text at notes 64-11 infra.
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that, by having advance knowledge that a search would be conducted, the defendant implicitly consented to be searched. In
United States v. Davis,46 for example, the court rejected the government's argument that the frequency of airport searches had negated
any expectation of privacy, but it then remanded the case on the
issue of consent. Because consent is a well-known exception47 to
the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches,
advance-notice cases might be resolved by finding-that the defendant
consented to the search, eliminating any need to reach the expectations
issue. Yet, if a defendant can be deemed to' have consented to any
search of which he had some sort of advance notice, then the result
will be the same as if the court had decided .that the government
can avoid the fourth amendment's requirements by controlling his
expectations.
Although the concepts of consent and expectation can both be
used to describe the scope of the fourth amendment, 48 the two concepts are not functionally identical. Giving consent, unlike having
an expectation, requires knowing and voluntary conduct. In
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,49 the Supreme Court explained the
voluntariness requirement of a "consent search" as follows:
[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the
consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress
or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact
to be determined from all the circumstances.50
At times it is difficult to determine whether the consent to· a
given search is voluntary. 51 for example, it is questionable whether
voluntariness exists if one must accede to a search of his ,,luggage
in order to board an airplane. Although an individual might avoid
the requisite search by using another mode of transportation, this alternative may not be possible or practical.
46. 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
47. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
48. As seen earlier, the concept of expectation, which is a function of belief or
knowledge, is used to describe the privacy interests protected by the fourth amendment. The scope of the belief or knowledge determines the scope of fourth amends
ment protection. ·See text at note 17 supra. Similarly, "the constitutional protection
against unreasonable search or seizure widens or narrows, depending on the difficulty
or ease with which the prosecution can establish that the defendant has 'consented'
to what would otherwise be an unconstitutional invasion of his privacy." Y. KAMI·
SAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 339 (4th ed. 1974).
49. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
50. 412 U.S. at 248-49.
51. For a discussion of some of the complexities of the concept of consent in
another context, see Note, Consent in Criminal Law: Violence in Sports, 15 MICH.
L. REV. 148 (1976).
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These difficulties with the consent concept are apparent in the
dormitory cases discussed earlier, 52 where university officials by
regulation or dormitory contract provision had reserved the right to
enter and search rooms "for inspection purposes." In Piazza/a v.
Watkins, 53 the court rejected the government's argument that, because
the students were aware of the regulation, they had consented to a
search by law enforcement officers for the purpose of obtaining evidence for a criminal prosecution. The court concluded that the students had "voluntarily" consented to being searched for limited
inspection purposes only. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. McCloskey,54 the court distinguished consent to a search by university officials from consent to a search by the police. Disagreeing with the
government's argument that the student had consented to the latter,
the court also rejected the argument that he had given the university
the authority to consent to the police search. 511
Cases such as Piazzola and M cC/oskey recognize that it is
possible to consent to a search for a limited purpose without altogether relinquishing the right to fourth amendment protection. In
such cases it may be said that the protection afforded the defendant
is diminished only to the extent that he has voluntarily carved out
an exception to the warrant requirement. 116
But there are other cases that have failed to recognize that, when
an individual consents to searches of part or all of his premises by
certain persons for specified p1,J.Ip0ses, the individual waives his expectations of privacy only in regard to those areas, people, and purposes.57 Katz failed to address whether such explicit distinctions can
be drawn upon the scope of the defendant's consent, stating only
that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not the subject of Fourth Amendment protection . . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." 58
52. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
53. 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971).
54. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970).
55. 217 Pa. Super. Ct. at 436, 272 A.2d at 273. A similar argument was re•
jected in Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964), where the government had contended that defendant's consent to a hotel clerk entering the defendant's room gave
the clerk apparent authority to consent to police entry of the room.
56. United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1971), illustrates this
point. In that case, the defendant told the police that they could search his house
for narcotics. In the course of the search, the police opened and examined sealed
private papers. The court concluded that this was not within the scope of the consent
and that the search was therefore invalid with respect to the papers.
51. Cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). In that case, the defendant
had released her business records to her tax accountant. The Court found that by
relinquishing her expectation of privacy as to the accountant, she had likewise re.
linquished any such expectation as to the Internal Revenue Service.
58. 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
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Nevertheless, the expectation of privacy test developed in that case
certainly is not inconsistent with differentiating between activities
and areas about which an individual has yield.ed his expectation and
those about which he has not.
In another class of decisions-the "plain view" cases-the issue
is whether the defendant has revealed his activities in such a way
that he has waived all expectation of privacy. If an individual exposes his activities to the possibility of public view, then it follows
that he is no longer entitled ·to expect those activities to be privatein effect, he has simply surrendered his interest in privacy by consenting to public observation of his conduct. Thus, if a police officer
views activities of the defendant in plain view from a place in which
he has a tight to be, the defendant cannot claim that he enjoyed a
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to those activities. 59
As stated by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Katz, "objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of
outsiders are not !protected' because no intention to keep them to
himself has been exhibited." 60
In another class of cases, the individual has yielded certain
expectations of privacy but has not surrendered them entirely. As
noted earlier, 61 an individual may allow a particularized segment of
the population to view his activities for a limited purpose while retaining his expectations of privacy with respect to others. For
example, suppose that an individual invites his neighbors to his backyard-which is hidden from public view-to engage in an illegal
activity. Clearly the individual does not expect to maintain privacy
from those whom he invites. It does not necessarily follow,
however, that the individual has voluntarily surrendered his expectations of privacy regarding the public or •the police. 62 The
59. The "plain view" doctrine, as described by the Supreme Court, provides that
"objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence." Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam). See generally J. ISRAEL &
W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 92-93 (2d ed. 1975).
60. 389 U.S. at 361.
61. See text at notes 53-58 supra.
62. In this regard, consider the factual setting of Recznik v. City of Lorain, 393
U.S. 166 (1968). Petitioner conducted a gambling operation on his own property,
a:nd large numbers of people entered the apartment to engage in this activity. Police
officers, ·noting the large number of cars near the apartment, climbed the apartment
stairs, entered unannounced through the back door, arrested everyone present, and
seized the gambling devices. The Court held that this entry violated the fourth
amendment, holding that the large number of people entering and leaving the apartment did not make it a public establishment. It might be said that the petitioner
surrendered his expectations of privacy only with respect to those that he allowed
upon his property. Had the gambling activity been in plain view, petitioner would
have surrendered all his expectations, and the police entry would have been permissible.
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dormitory cases noted earlier are within this category. 68
In summary, the concept of consent is closely linked to the
actual expectation requirement of the Katz test. By consenting to a
search, an individual surrenders his expectations of privacy. Similarly, by vountarily exposing his activities to the public, an individual
consents -to public view of, and hence surrenders his expectations of
privacy with respect to, those activities.
B.

The Reasonable Expectation Requirement

Thus far, this Note has suggested ·that, if the expectation of
privacy test is to provide adequate protection of fourth amendment
interests, limitations must be placed upon the actual expectation requirement. As this section indicates, these limitations would have
little significance unless they were complemented with limitations
o~ the second part of Justice Harlan's test-"that the expectation
be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 64
In determining whether an expectation is reasonable, courts have
often considered whether the efforts of a defendant to preserve the
privacy of his activities are reasonably calculated to achieve that result. The expectation of privacy is considered reasonable only if the
defendant's efforts to preserve privacy involve the taking of "sufficient" precautions65-if a reasonable person would have preserved his
privacy by taking precautions that the defendant did not implement,
then -the defendant's expectation of privacy is not reasonable. Embodied in this approach •to defining the reasonableness of expectations is the notion that a defendant who has failed to take sufficient
precautions has assumed the risk that the police will detect his
activities. 66
The above result is consistent with the misplaced confidence cases. See note 66
infra and accompanying text.
63. See text at notes 53-55 supra.

64. It is elementary that the term "reasonableness," as used in tort law, includes
the concept of foreseeability. As applied to the expectation of privacy test, however,
the term refers to the justifiability of the expectation. The following example illustrates the distinction between these concepts. Although it may be improbable, based
on past experience, that a police officer with a· flashlight will be strolling through
a desolate comer of Central Park in the middle of the night, the expectation of pri•
vacy of narcotics peddlers who rely on this improbability by conducting an illegal
transaction in that desolate comer is not justifiable. One commentator has asserted
that, in such situations, justifiability should be determined by factors such as the nature of the intended area of private control, the kind of information sought to be
preserved as private, and the means of governmental intrusion, as well as by fore•
seeability of intrusion. See Note, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968, supra note 6, at 982-86,
It should be noted that Katz speaks in terms of justifiability, 389 U.S. at 353, as
does United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,752 (1971).
65. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hemley, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 263 A.2d 904
(1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 0971), discussed in text at note 67 infra.
66. This notion of assumption of risk also underlies the pre-Katz misplaced con-
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An inquiry that focuses on precautions provides an objective
means of determining whether a defendant has manifested an intention to keep his activities to himself. Even so, however, such an
inquiry does not advance the analysis of whether fourth amendment
protection should be granted in a given case. By shifting the
question of whether a search is reasonable from a consideration of expectations to a consideration of precautions, courts are simply substituting one objective criterion for another, with no resulting refinement qf the "reasonableness" concept. If taking precautions against
particular kinds of intrusions is either unduly burdensome to the defendant or wholly inconsistent with basic notions of individual
autonomy, it cannot be said that his failure to take the precaution
is unreasonable and that as a result he has no reasonable expectation
of privacy. In short, the fourth amendment only insists that an individual take reasonable precautions; simply insisting on precautions
does not advance the analysis of what is reasonable.
An example of how an analysis that focuses on precautions can be
misapplied is found in Commonwealth v. Hernley. 67 FBI agenrts made
warrantless nocturnal observations with binoculars through the windows of the defendant's print shop while standing on a four-foot ladder
situated on abutting railroad tracks thirty-five feet from the shop. The
height of the shop's windowsills exceeded the height -of an average
man, and thus no one who was standing on the ground outside the
building could have observed activities within the shop. Even so,
the court refused to find an unreasonable search within the meaning
of the fourth amendment, determining that the defendant's expectation was not reasonable because he could have curtained his
windows. 68 Even though the CQUrt conceded that the defendant had
an actual expectation of privacy, it deemed this expectation unfidence cases. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee
v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). In these cases, the defendants voluntarily
reposed confidence in, and exposed their illegal activities to, persons who, unknown
to the defendants, were either undercover agents or informants. The Court held in
each case that this type of governmental intrusion is not a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Katz has not changed the manner in which the Court has treated this line of
cases. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). In concluding that the
defendant had assumed the risk, the Court used a balancing approach: the government's interest in using informants is balanced with the defendlfnt's interest in having
confidants whom he -can trust. If the balance is struck on the side of the interest
in using informants, the Court concludes that the defendant has assumed the risk.
-See 401 U.S. at 768 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
67. 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914
(1971).
68. 216 Pa. Super. Ct. at 181-82, 263 A.2d at 907. · Another case explained the
precautions analysis as follows: "It is the duty of a policeman to investigate, and we
cannot say that . . . the Fourth Amendment itself draws the blinds the occupant
could have drawn but did not." United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1078 n.15

170

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 76:154

reasonable since he had failed to guard against the possibility that
law enforcement officers might look through his windows with the
assistance of a ladder and binoculars. Clearly the court failed to
evaluate the reasonableness of possible precautions in light of the
nature of the intrusion. As one writer has argued, this sort of
reasoning, if taken to its logical extreme, would afford fourth amendment protection only to those who live within windowless, soundproof forts. 69
It thus seems clear that the reasonableness of requiring an
individual to take a given precaution in order to receive fourth
amendment protection should depend upon the circumstances of the
particular situation. United States v. Holmes70 illustrates this point.
In that case, narcotics agents found and seized marijuana on the defendants'· farm. The government argued that the defendants had no
reasonable expectation of privacy because they had failed to post
"no trespassing" signs, erect fences, or undertake other measures
to conceal the marijuana from passersby.71 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that it ignored the- character of the
farm property. The court reasoned ithat, although a homeowner in
a densely populated urban area might have to take greater precautions to protect his activity from detection by a casual passerby,
a resident of a rural area whose property is surrounded by a dense
growth "need not anticipate" 72 that government agents might crawl
through the underbrush and therefore need not post signs warning
such agents to stay away. Holmes thus recognized that only reasonable precautions should be demanded and that what is reasonable
must be assessed in light of the character of the area being
searched. 73
Justice Harlan, in his dissent in United States v. White, 74 recog(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973), quoting State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481,
496, 181 A.2d 161, 769 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 835 (1963).
69. Note, 23 CLEv~ ST. L. REV. 63, supra note 6, at 72. Compare the view of
Judge J. Skelly Wright:
Is it not important to our American way of life that when a citizen does as much
as ordinary care requires to shield his sanctuary from strangers his constitutional
right to maintain his privacy should not be made to depend upon the resources
of skillful peepers and eavesdroppers who can always find ways to intrude?
United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 947 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
70. 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), affd. in part and revd. in part on rehearing,
531 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. •1976) (per curiam).
71. 521 F.2d at 869-70.
72. 521 F.2d at 870.
73. Yet, the reference to what the homeowner "need not anticipate" sounds like
nothing more than a reference to what he should reasonably expect. If the court
is'determining the necessity for taking precautions by reference to reasonable expectations, then the analysis is circular.
74. 401 U.S. 145 (1971).

November 1977]

Expectation of Privacy

171

nized the weakness of an inflexible expectation of privacy test. He
argued that proper an~ysis must go beyond the search for subjective
expectation and for assumption of risk through the failure to take
precautions, because expectations and the risks assumed are largely
reflections of laws that embody the customs and values of the past
and present. 75 Therefore, to determine whether a warrant should
be required, Justice Harlan suggested that the nature of a particular
police practice and its probable impact on an individual's sense of
security be balanced against the utility of the practice as a law enforcement technique. 76 Justice Harlan's point is that the fourth
amendment entitles persons to have certain minimum expectations
of privacy. If Katz is applied without this notion in mind, then the
expectation of privacy test might be used to undercut the very
essence of the right of privacy that it purports to protect. 77

II.

THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
AREAS AFTER Katz

Thus far this Note has suggested that an expectations analysis
ca.1not adequately protect fourth amendment interests unless the test
ace ounts for the government's ability to manipulate actual expectatio as and unless courts, when determining the reasonableness of the
expectation, insist only upon reasonable precautions. In essence,
courts must recognize that the core of the fourth amendment contains a minimum set of expectations to which all persons are entitled.
It is to two crucial aspects of this analysis-the limits of this mini. mum set of expectations and the weight accorded the privacy inter~t
in situations where other factors demand recognition-that this
Note now turns.
A.

Privacy Versus Property Interests: The
lmplicati(!ns of Kara

Katz rejected the view ·that the validity of a warrantless search
can be determined by referring to the traditional "constitutionally
protected area" standard,78 instead holding that the fourth amendment "protects people, not places. " 79 This approach generated con75. 401 U.S. at 786. Justice Douglas made a similar point in his dissent to denial
of certiorari in United States v. Williamson, 405 U.S. 1026, 1029 (1972): "Obviously citizens must bear only those threats to privacy which we decide to impose."
76. 401 U.S. at 786.
77. Justice Douglas has argued that the very essence of the right of privacy is
the right of the individual to choose whether to reveal his possessions to the- police.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323-25 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
One commentator has defined privacy as the control we have over information
about ourselves. Fried, Privacy, 11 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968).
78. 389 U.S. at 350-51.
79. 389 U.S. at 351.
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fusion 80 about the degree of protection afforded certain areas-such
as the home-traditionally thought to be at the core of the amendment. 81 Moreover, the extent to which property concepts would
continue to have vitality was not clear, for, as Justice Harl~n noted
in his concurring opinion, the key question is what protection the
fourth amendment affords people, and generally the answer to that
question requires reference to a place. 82
The difference between the constitutionally protected areas
standard and the reasonable expectation of privacy standard can be
characterized as a dichotomy between property interests and privacy
interests. 83 Since the Katz decision expresses a clear preference for
privacy interest analysis over property interest analysis, 84 the pertinent question after Katz is what role, if any, property interests play
in defining fourth amendment protection.
One possible interpretation is that the Katz expectations test has
totally displaced the protected areas standard. Under this view, the
traditional notion that certain areas are protected retains vitality only
insofar as expectations of privacy in those areas are deemed reasonable. Property interests are, in effect, "incorporated" into the expectations test. 85 A second possible interpretation is that the
protected areas standard retains independent significance. Under
this view, the expectations test supplements the protected areas test
80. See, e.g., United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 921 (1973): "[Katz] expresses little more than a rejection of the trespass
rule. It does not tell us what people are protected, when they are protected, or why
they are protected."
81. See text at notes 100-13 infra.
82. 389 U.S. at 361. In commenting on Katz's holding that the fourth amendment protects people, not places, one critic stated that
[t]he only merit in this comment is its brevity. Of course the amendment is for
the benefit of people, not places. But it may protect peoples' places and properties-"houses, papers, and effects," in the language of the amendment-even
when people are not in them or in immediate possession of them, and it may
protect people themselves-i.e., "persons"-more fully when they are in one
place than another.
T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 112-13 (1969).
83. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), the Supreme Court spoke
of "the indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property."
The contrast in focus between an approach based on property interests and one based
on privacy interests is discussed in Supreme Court, supra note 3', at 189.
84. In holding that the constitutionally protected areas doctrine was not controlling in Katz, the Court noted that the premise that property interests control the
right of the government to search and seize had been discredited. 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967) (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975), affd. in part
and revd. in part per curiam on rehearing, 537 F.2d 227 (Sth Cir. 1976); United
States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1973); United
States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Freeman, 426 F.2d
1351 (9th Cir. 1970).

November 1977]

Expectation of Privacy.

173

in situations where the latter does not sufficiently protect the defendant. so .
The difference between these two interpretations is significant.
Underlying the view that the expectations standard wholly displaces
the protected areas test is the assumption that a defendant's expectation of privacy in a traditionally protected area-such as his horn~
is only prima facie reasonable: 87 A warrantless search of such an
area is presumed unreasonable, but this presumption can be rebutted
with evidence that the defendant had no actual expectation of
privacy or that, because he failed to take certain precautions, he had
no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. But under the
view that the protected areas test retains independent force, searches
that do not fall within any of the standard exceptions88 to the fourth
amendment warrant requirement are per se unreasonable: if a warrantless search occurs in a traditionally protected area, evidence regarding both actual expectations and precautions is irrelevant in
determining the reasonableness of the search. Thus, the privacy
value of a traditionally protected area receives greater recognition
under the second interpretation than it does under the first. In
essence, allowing the protected area standard to have independent
force adds an extra dimension to the expectation of privacy standard
by protecting the right to have certain expectations.
·
Because the expectations test formulated in Katz does not draw
distinctions based on property concepts, it might seem inconsistent
with that case to allow the protected areas test to retain any independent force. The language and context of Katz, however, indicate
that no such inconsistency exists. Katz involved a nontrespassory
surveillance of a public telephone booth, and it was in that setting
that the Court concluded that the correct solution of fourth amendment problems is "not necessarily promoted by incantations
the
phrase 'constitutionally protected area.' " 89 The Court went on to
state. that, although the amendment protects
individual privacy
.

of

86. See, e.g., Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1974); State v. Crea,
305 Minn. 342, 233 N.W.2d 736 (1975). In Fixel, the Fifth Circuit noted that it
would have reached the same result under either the constitutionally protected areas
test or the reasonable expectation of privacy standard. 492 F.2d at 483-84.
87. As Justice Harlan said in his concurring opinion in Katz, "a man's home is,
for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy." 389 U.S. at 361.
88. This qualification is necessary because there are a number of well-known exceptions to the prohibition against warrantless searches, regardless of where they may
occur. Among these exceptions are search incident to a lawful arrest (Chime! v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)); consent (Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218
( 1973)); hot pursuit of a fleeing felon (Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967));
search to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence (Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10 (1948) ).
89. 389 U.S. at 350 (emphasis added).
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against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, "its protections go
further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all." 00
The Court in Katz concluded that the underpinnings of two cases
that had invoked the constitutionally protected areas test-Olmstead
v. United States91 and Goldman v. United States92-had been so
eroded by subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine03 of
those cases could no longer be regarded as controlling. 94 Yet it is
one thing to assert that a doctrine is no longer controlling and
another to contend that it has been entirely displaced. 06 Thus, it
might be the case that the Court merely intended that intrusion into
a traditionally protected area would no longer be a necessary condition for invoking fourth amendment protection, rather than intending
that such intrusion would no longer be a sufficient condition for
invoking that protection.
This reading of Katz is supported by other arguments. Katz has
been characterized as a policy decision designed to expand fourth
amendment protection to cases in which the government's nontrespassory intrusion was effectuated by modern technological means. 911
The expectations test was established in Katz simply to cover a contingency that the traditional test could not handle. Furthermore,
because Katz involved neither a search undertaken by physical intrusion nor a search of an area in which the defendant had a property
interest, -the case can be read as standing for the proposition that property concepts are useful in some factual settings but are inconsequen90. 389 U.S. at 350 (footnote omitted). The Court added that it had never suggested that the protected areas concept would provide a "talismanic solution to every
Fourth Amendment problem.'' 389 U.S. at 351 n.9. In this regard, Professor Amsterdam has argued that "[a]n opinion which sets aside prior formulas with the observation that they cannot 'serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment
problem' should hardly be read as intended to replace them with a new talisman.''
Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 385.
91. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
92. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
93. The constitutionally protected areas doctrine has also been called the trespass
doctrine, because in cases such as Olmstead and Goldman, which involved electronic
eavesdropping committed without trespass into a traditionally protected area, the
Court found that there had been no search and seizure within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. See generally J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, supra note 59, at 88, 168.
94. 389 U.S. at 347.
95. Olmstead and Goldman were based on the notion that eavesdropping was not
a search or seizure as well as on the fact that no trespass had been committed. In
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), the Court determined that eavesdropping could constitute a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. In
that case, however, the police had effectuated the eavesdropping by inserting a "spike
mike" into the party wall between the defendant's house and the house occupied by
the police, and the Court did not indicate clearly whether this physical penetration
into the defendant's premises was a fact crucial to its decision. See J. ISRAEL & W.
LAFAVE, supra note 59, at 170-71.
96. Note, 9 IND. L. REV. 468, supra note 6, at 475.
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tial in others. In short, it does not necessarily follow from Katz that
the values underlying the old protected areas •test were intended to be
displaced by the new expectations test, and therefore it is not inconsistent with that case to allow the constitutionally protected areas test
to retain independent force.
Given that both tests can coexist, the question remains whether
the protected areas test should retain vitality. Katz has been viewed
as expanding the scope of fourth amendment protection. 97 Yet, if
Katz renders impotent the protected areas standard and if the .expectations standard is applied without adequate limitations, a defendant
could receive less protection after Katz than he would have received
before it. 98 One critic has remarked that, although it may be reassuring to be told that one's privacy will receive as much protection
in a phone booth as in one's home, it.is not so reassuring to realize
that one's privacy will receive as little protection in one's home as in
a phone booth. 00 An interpretation of Katz that retains the constitutionally protected areas test as an independent standard would
provide a more secure safeguard against intrusive government
searches. Under this view, certain areas-those at the core of the
fourth amendment-would exist where a person would know that
he is secure from intrusive governmental activities regardless of the
.extent to which the government manipulates an individual's expectations and regardless of the precautions against intrusion that courts
determine he should have taken.
B.

Defining a Minimum Content of the
Fourth Amendment

1.

The Home as a Core Value

The home is an obvious starting point inthe search for the minimum content of the fourth amendment, for the word4tg of the amendment makes clear the great emphasis it places upon the right of the
people to be secure in their houses. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has expressly stated that the sanctity of the home is a
core value of the amendment. In the landmark case of Boyd v. United
States, 100 the Court said that the fourth amendment serves to protect
97. Even Professor Amsterdam, who has rather severely criticized the lack of precision in the Katz opinion, see, e.g., text at note 18 supra, has stated that, "[a]s a
doctrinal matter, it seems clear that the effect of Katz is to expand rather than generally to reconstruct the boundaries of fourth amendment protection." Amsterdam,
supra note 6, at 385.
98. Professor Amsterdam has recognized this possibility. See Amsterdam, supra
note 6, at 460 n.349.
·
99. T. TAYLOR, supra note 82, at 114.
100. 116 l,J.S. 616 (1886).
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"the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." 101 In
Silverman v. United States, 102 the Court said that a person's right
to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion while in his
own home is at the very core of the fourth amendment. 103 Significantly, the Court in Silverman acknowledged the sanctity of the
home even though it rejected the view that fourth amendment rights
are inevitably defined by technical trespass law. 104 Although· Silverman was ultimately decided on the ground that the police had made
a physical invasion of the premises, Katz viewed Silverman as discrediting the trespass doctrine and as providing a precedent for the
Court's shift in emphasis from property to privacy concepts. 105
The theme of the sanctity of the home has continued in postKatz case law, as illustrated by two of the major post-Katz electronic
surveillance cases. In United States v. United States District
Court,1° 6 the ·Court stated that its decision in Katz had refused to
limit the fourth amendment to instances of actual physical trespass,
although "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which
the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." 107 According
to the Court, the amendment's "broader spirit"108 now shields private
speech from unreasonable surveillance. Thus, in this opinion the
Court viewed Katz as expanding the scope of the amendment's protection rather than simply replacing the standard for measuring its
scope.
In Alderman v. United States, 109 the Court indicated that it did
not intend to increase protection of privacy at the expense of protection of property. In that case, the Court held that a defendant has
standing to assert a personal fourth amendment defense to a search and
seizure of conversations that occurred in his house even if he was
not present or did not participate in them. The Court said that the
"security of persons and property remains a fundamental value which
law enforcement officers must respect."110 It rejected the argument
that a person has no standing to seek to exclude evidence of conversations overheard in his home unless his own conversational privacy
is invaded; instead the Court concluded that the person may object
because the conversations were the fruits of an unauthorized search
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

116 U.S. at 630.
365 U.S. 505 (1961).
365 U.S. at 511.
365 U.S. at 511.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
407 U.S. 297 (1972).
407 U.S. at 313.
407 U.S. at 313.
394 U.S. 165 (1969).
394 U.S. at 175.
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of his house, the privacy nf "which is itself expressly protected by the
Fourth Amendment." 111 Referring to the "express security for the
home provided by the Fourth Amendment," 112 the Court stated that
it did not believe "that Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment
protects persons and their private conversations, was intended to
withdraw any of the protection which the amendment extends to the
home." 113
In short, it appears that the privacy standard articulated in Katz
is not inconsistent with defining the protection of the fourth amendment by reference to a place. One area that can be described in
such geographic terms is the home-and it has been shown that the
sanctity of the home appears to be at the very core of the fourth
amendment. To the extent that the home has this protected status,
the constitutionally protected areas standard and its reliance upon
property concepts retain vitality after Katz.
2.

The Distinction Between Open Fields and Curtilage

The continued vitality of the open field-curtilage distinction,
which was first recognized in pre-Katz cases, also supports the notion
that property concepts embraced by the constitutionally protected
areas test retain vitality after Katz. In 1924, the Supreme Court
held in Hester v. United States114 that the fourth amendment did not
protect activities or objects in an open field even if a defendant had
property rights in the field and the government agents who discovered the incriminating evidence had technically committed a trespass
upon the property. In the interim between Hester and Katz, the
courts further illuminated the protected areas concept by extending
the protection of the fourth amendment to the house's curtilage,
based on the notion that the curtilage was-just as an open field was
not-an extension of a traditionally protected area, the house. 115
Thus, prior to Katz, actual trespass upon an individual's prop~rty by
111. 394 U.S. at 117.
112. 394 U.S. at 179.
113. 394 U.S. at 180.
114. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
115. See, e.g., Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1966); Walker
v. United States, 225 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1955). One court has defined curtilage
as including "all buildings in close proximity to a dwelling, which are continually
used for carrying on domestic employment; or such place as is necessary and convenient to a dwelling, and is habitually used for family purposes." United States v.
Potts, 297 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1961).
In McDowell v. United States, 383 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1967), the court refused
to extend fourth amendment protection to open fields even though the defendant had
posted "no trespassing" signs. Under the precautions analysis of Katz, it could certainly be argued that the defendant had manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy.
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governmental officials was a necessary-but not a sufficientcondition of fourth amendment protection.
Although Katz announced that privacy is an appropriate concept
by which to measure the scope of fourth amendment protection, the
continued reference in decisions to the distinction between open fields
and curtilage116 not only suggests the continued vitality of a protected
areas test but also provides support for the proposition that the home
and those areas functionally related to it are at the core of the
amendment. Unfortunately, the coexistence of the open fieldcurtilage distinction and the expectation of privacy test has not
always been harmonious: as the following discussion indicates, the
two doctrines can lead to disparate results under identical factual
situations.
Wattenburg v. United States117 illustrates a situation in which the
protected areas test and expectation of privacy test reach identical
results. In that case, government officials entered the defendant's
land and searched a stockpile of cut trees located thirty-five feet
from a lodge in which he and a co-defendant resided. The court,
citing Hester, held that the defendants were protected by the fourth
amenqment because the stockpile was within the curtilage. 118 The
court then stated that "a more appropriate test [than the one based
on curtilage] in determining if a search and seizure adjacent to a
house .is. constitutionally forbidden is whether it constitutes an intrusion upon what the resident seeks to preserve as private even in an
area which, although adjacent to his home, is accessible to the public."119 Finally, the court concluded that the search of the stockpile
was illegal under this test as well. 120 W attenburg thus demonstrates
that when a law enforcement officer enters the curtilage and conducts a warrantless search, he can be viewed not only as invading
a property area protected by the fourth amendment but also as intruding upon the defendant's reasonable expectations of privacy
regarding objects and activities hidden from view within the curtilage.
In other situations, however, courts could reach conflicting
results by applying the expectations test and the protected areas test.
116. See, e.g., in addition to the cases discussed in the text at notes 117-23 infra,
State v. Crea, 305 Minn. 342, 345, 233 N.W.2d 736, 739 (1975).
It should be noted that Justice Harlan alluded to the open field-curtilage distinction in his concurring opinion in Katz, when he interpreted the Court's opinion as
holding that an enclosed telephone booth is an area like a home, but unlike a field,
in which a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.
389 U.S. at 360.
117. 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968).
118. 388 F.2d at 857.
119. 388 F.2d at 857.
120. 388 F.2d at 858.
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The contradictory holdings in Fullbright v. United States121 and
United States v. Kim 122 are illustrative of this possibility. In Fullbright, the court upheld the admissibility of evidence that federal
agents had gathered by using binoculars to observe the defendants'
activities inside a shed that was a part of the curtilage of a clefendant's house. In making their observations, the agents had stood outside the curtilage in an open field owned by a defendant: The court
refused to declare the search unreasonable, noting that the observations by the agents would have been proscribed had they physically
breached the curtilage. The court did note that, in light of Katz,
some circumstances might exist-though the court did not discuss
what they might be-in which observation from an open field would
violate the fourth amendment. Even so, it relied on Hester in concluding that the observations in the instant case could not be deemed
an unreasonable search. 123
In Kim, the court applied the expectations test and reached the
opposite result on nearly identical facts. In that case, FBI agents
used a telescope to observe gambling activities in the defendant's
apartment. Even though the agents had not physically breached the
curtilage, the court suppressed the evidence. The court stated that
it is inconceivable that the government can intrude so far into a person's home that it can detect the material he is reading and· still not
be considered to have engaged in a search that violates the fourth
amendment. 124
The result in· Fullbright under the protected areas test is
troubling because the officers, while positioned in a place where they
had a right to be, were able to observe the defendants' activities only
by using binoculars. This use of a device that increased their
sensory perception in effect transplanted the agents into a location
within the curtilage, where their unaided observation would have
violated the fourth amendment. 125 Thus, in order- to protect the
values underlying the fourth amendment, courts should recognize
that certain property interests-such as the home and surrounding
areas functionally related to it-carry with them corresponding expectations of privacy from any kind of intrusion. The final section
of this Note more fully explains the implications of this proposed
standard.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968).
415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Hawaii 1976).
392 F.2d at 434-35.
415 F. Supp. at 1256.
Under the plain view doctrine adopted in Harris v. United States, 390 U.S.

Michigan Law Review

180

ill.

[Vol. 76:154

PROPERTY INTERESTS AS A Priori REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS

Thus far, this discussion has suggested that the distinction
between the protected areas standard and the expectation of privacy
standard could be characterized as a dichotomy between property
and privacy interests. The significance of the apparent dichotomy
is evidenced by the fact that courts have sometimes applied these
standards to similar factual settings and reached different results.
This discussion has also demonstrated that the home is a protected
area at the core of the fourth amendment. Given these two considerations, this Note submits that the fourth amendment will provide more
prinoipled protection if the expectations-protected areas distinction is
no longer viewed as dichotomous. Rather, fourth amendment doctrine should recognize that certain property interests constitute expectations that should be predefined as "reasonable" and thereby
immunized from reduction through advance notice or through insistence upon unreasonable precautions.
It is important to recognize that the protected areas standard as
well as the expectations standard is rooted in considerations of
privacy. The purpose of the fourth amendment is not to protect
property per se; rather, houses are protected, as are papers and
effects, not merely because of a possessory or ownership interest but
also because of an interest in keeping them private. 126 As the
234 (1968), an observation within the plain view of a police officer who is positioned
in a place where he has a right to be is not conceptually a "search" within the mean•
ing of the fourth amendment. In Fullbright, the observations were made from a
place where the federal agents had a right to be, since an officer may enter private
property when his duties so require even though his conduct is technically a trespass.
See United States v. Capps, 435 F.2d 637, 640 n.4 (9th Cir. 1970). However, the
agents would not have been able to observe the defendants' illegal activities from the
field if they had not used binoculars. Because the activities were in "plain view"
only with the aid of devices that had the effect of transplanting the agents into a
place where they had no right to be, it is questionable whether the plain view doctrine
is applicable to the facts of Fullbright. In this regard it is noteworthy that the Kim
court limited the plain view doctrine to an unaided plain view and thus held it inapplicable to the facts of that case. 415 F. Supp. at 1256.
·
The plain view doctrine, with or without accounting for the added factor of
devices that increase sensory perception, can be reconciled with both the protected
areas and the reasonable expectation of privacy tests. Under the former, plain view
observations are made outside protected areas; under the latter, there can be no rea•
sonable expectation of privacy where such observations are possible. Moreover,
either test can be used to determine whether the place from which the observation
is made is a place where the police officer has a right to be. For an example of
the use of the reasonable expectation of privacy test in making such a determination,
see United States v. Johnson, No. 73.-2221 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1977) (Leventhal, J.,
concurring). It is noteworthy that Judge Leventhal determined the reasonableness
of the expectation by reference to the open field-curtilage distinction, which indicates
the continuing vitality of that protected areas concept.
126. As 'Justice Marshall has noted, the property concepts that shaped early
fourth amendment law attempted to define a sphere of personal privacy. Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 349 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
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Supreme Court stated in Silverman v. United States: 127
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his house;
he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that
they cannot get at him without disobeying the Constitution. That is
still a sizeable hunk of liberty-worth protecting from encroachment.
A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis, some
shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave,
some inviolate place which is a man's castle.128
Moreover, the protected areas standard is concerned with expectations of privacy. To say that one knows that his home is an area

protected from public. scrutiny is to say that one knows that his
expectations of privacy in his home will be fulfilled. Thus, the difference between the expectations test and the protected areas test
need not be characterized as involving a choice of protecting either
property or privacy interests. Rather, the two standards are distinguishable on the basis of the protection each accords to fundamental
expectations of privacy: the protected areas standard defines a set
of expectations that, because people are entitled to hold them, receive protection regardless of governmental manipulation of actual
expectations or judicial assessment of the adequacy of precaution,
whereas the reasonable expectation of privacy standard leaves the
protected set of expectations undefined. This analysis suggests that
property notions should be used to define the minimum content of
fourth amendment protection since the expectations test, standing
alone, leaves the scope of protected expectations undefined and subject to manipulation by the government. If privacy as well as property is to be protected adequately, people need to be secure i:Q. the
knowledge that some areas exist that can never be subject to warrantless searches without a violation of the fourth amendment. 120
People need to know that the government cannot eliminate expectations of privacy for these areas through advance notice that the area
is not protect.eel, and they should be assured that they need not take
unduly burdensome precautions to prevent every conceivable· kind
of investigative technique.
If the difference between the protected areas test and the expectation of privacy test is characterized as this Note suggests, then it
is possible to protect both property interests and privacy interests
simultaneously. Once it is recognized that the fourth amendment
127. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
128. 365 U.S. at 511 n.4 (quoting with approval United States v. On Lee, ·193
F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting)), affd., 343 U.S. ·747
(1952) ).
129. Justice Douglas went so far as to insist that the fourth amendment creates
a zone of privacy that police cannot enter even with a proper warrant. Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 325 (1967) (dissenting opinion). See generally Note, 90
HARV. L. REV. 945, supra note 4.
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protects the right to have certain expectations of privacy-those associated with the home and other areas functionally related to itit is no longer necessary to view property interests and privacy interests as dichotomous. Thus, by deeming the expectation of privacy
in traditionally protected areas to be a priori "reasonable," because
the holder of the property interest has a right to expect privacy, both
the protected areas test and the expectations test are satisfied.
Of course, it might be argued that even activities occurring in
a protected area should not always be protected by the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. If an individual reveals his
activities to the plain view of the public, it might be said that the
individual has no right to an expectation of privacy. Furthermore,
a police officer who perceives an activity in a protected area without
trespassing upon the curtilage or enhancing his sensory abilities by
resorting to artificial devices should not be subject to the fourth
amendment. Thus, the set of expectations to which one is entitled
may be predefined-in the same sense that the term "search" is predefined not to include observations of evidence in plain view130to exclude those observations that are accomplished without either
trespass or artificial devices. 131
This Note suggests that the minimum content of the fourth
amendment can be determined under the traditional constitutionally
protected areas test. Thus, the Note proposes a two-stage test to
determine the constitutionality of warrantless searches. First, the
court must inquire whether the search occurred in a constitutionally
protected area. If so, the court's inquiry must end and the search
must be declared invalid, unless it falls under one of the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 132 If the search was conducted elsewhere, the court then must apply the two-part test suggested by Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz with the modifications suggested in section I above. In effect, the test proposed by this Note corrects the fundamental flaw of the Katz test
by recognizing that persons are entitled to have certain expectations
of privacy.
Professor Amsterdam has suggested that the courts should
130. See note 125 supra.
131. It might appear that merely dropping the requirement that a defendant have
a subjective expectation of privacy would be sufficient to ensure adequate protection
for the right to have certain expectations. Under this analysis, the reasonableness
requirement would by itself be sufficient to protect fourth amendment rights without
insisting that certain expectations be predefined as reasonable. This test, however,
would still allow courts to make ad hoc judgments of reasonableness concerning
searches in the home, and thus the right to have expectations of privacy in the home
would not receive recognition as a core value of the fourth amendment.
132. See note 88 supra.
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approach fourth amendment issues by asking what we as members
of society want to demand from government. 133 This Note suggests
a similar approach: courts should decide fourth amendment issues
by asking what we are entitled to expect from the government, rather
than by asking what the government will allow us to expect.

133. Amsterdam, supra note 6, at .384.

